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Misfire: How the North Carolina Pistol Purchase Permit System 
Misses the Mark of Constitutional Muster and Effectiveness* 
The North Carolina pistol-purchase permit system, originating in the Jim Crow 
Era, remains an obstruction for North Carolinians seeking to exercise their 
Second Amendment rights. The permit system requires that an individual 
possess a permit to purchase a handgun. Permits can only be obtained by applying 
to one’s local county sheriff’s office, assuming the applicant satisfies a myriad of 
conditions and pays the five-dollar per-permit fee. 
Such a system directly implicates the core of the Second Amendment by posing a 
direct burden on the ability of one to acquire a handgun for possession in the 
home. Under the modern two-part test for the Second Amendment, the 
permitting system falls short of satisfying strict scrutiny, as well as intermediate 
scrutiny. In addition, the permitting system faces difficulties in the face of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
As a whole, the system is largely redundant with federal law, adding cost, time, 
and frustration for handgun purchasers. Furthermore, the permitting system is 
ripe for abuse by allowing denials for subjective “good cause.” This subjective 
criteria for denial is suspect since Black applicants are rejected at a rate near 
three times as high as White applicants. Finally, when compared to states 
without the permitting requirement, North Carolina’s crime rates are within a 
few percentage points of theirs, indicating that the permitting system is not 
sensible policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While facially racist laws have mostly faded into the past, in North 
Carolina, gun-control laws from the Jim Crow era1 stay on the books—more 
than one-hundred years after their inception. 2  The North Carolina pistol-
purchase permit system (“North Carolina permit system” or “permit system”) 
is an antiquated gun-control law that requires the grant of a pistol-purchase 
permit for a citizen to purchase a handgun.3 It is one of a host of similar state 
pistol-permit schemes, most of which have been repealed.4 
The North Carolina permit system is unconstitutional under the Second 
and Fourteenth Amendments and is not sensible policy. The legislature should 
repeal the permit system and opt to follow existing federal gun control which 
achieves nearly identical results. 
Part I of this Comment explores the origins and operations of the system, 
as well as the racialized history of gun control and its lingering presence today 
 
 1. See A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States: Jim Crow Era, GEO. L. LIBR., 
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4172697 [https://perma.cc/T57F-NMLB] (July 
29, 2020, 7:23 AM) [hereinafter A Brief History] . The Jim Crow era was a period of time in the early-
to-late 1800s and early 1900s where southern Democrats enacted discriminatory legislation in an 
attempt to suppress minority populations—Black Americans in particular. Id. Much of the legislation 
focused on inhibiting Black Americans from voting, as well as from interacting with the White 
population. Id. 
 2. See infra Sections I.B. 
 3. See infra Sections I.A. 
 4. See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text. 
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in the form of the permit system. Part II delves into the cornerstone Second 
Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller 5  and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago. 6  Part III discusses lower court rulings post-Heller/McDonald and 
details the prominent two-part test modernly used for Second Amendment 
challenges. This part also explores the lesser used Kavanaugh Test. Part IV 
applies the two-part test to the North Carolina permit system, concluding that 
strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review for assessing the 
constitutionality of the permit system. 7 This part also evaluates the permit 
system under the Kavanaugh test and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this 
part compares the North Carolina permit system with existing federal gun-
control laws and explores the overall efficacy of pistol-purchase permitting 
schemes. This Comment concludes with a recommendation that the North 
Carolina legislature repeal the permit system to instead rely on existing federal 
gun control. 
I.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
An analysis of the North Carolina permit system provides insight into 
both the motivations of post-Civil War state legislatures as well as the current 
state of Second Amendment jurisprudence. First, this Comment will discuss 
the origins and operations of the permit system and its underlying motivations. 
Second, it addresses the principal Second Amendment cases of Heller and 
McDonald. Lastly, this part will explore how lower courts have treated the 
Second Amendment since Heller and McDonald and discuss the modern tests 
employed. 
A. Origins and Operation of the Law 
The North Carolina permit system dates back to 1905, when the state 
legislature considered the idea of having local governments enact restrictions 
on the sale of arms.8 The North Carolina permit system, which was mandated 
statewide, came to life in 1919 with the requirement that, before transfer of a 
pistol, one must acquire a license or permit from the clerk of superior court.9 
 
 5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 6. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 7. This Comment assumes Heller is the law but acknowledges that many lower courts have 
resisted and even ignored the holding. See infra Part III. See generally Brittany Occhipinti, We the Militia 
of the United States of America: A Reanalysis of the Second Amendment, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 431 
(2017) (arguing that Heller should be read to support a militia-oriented interpretation of the Second 
Amendment). 
 8. An Act to Amend the Charter of the Town of Pine Bluff, in Moore County, Priv. L. No. 
1905-35, ch. 188, § 6, 1905 N.C. Sess. Laws 545, 547 (1905). 
 9. An Act to Regulate the Sale of Concealed Weapons in North Carolina, ch. 197, § 1, 1919 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 397, 397 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 
2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)). 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
532 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
Originally, each permit cost fifty cents.10 The law required that the clerk of 
superior court find that the permit applicant possessed good moral character 
and desired to acquire the pistol for protection of their home.11 
Presently, the sale of weapons in North Carolina is regulated under Article 
52A of the General Statutes of North Carolina.12 The permit system prohibits 
any person from selling, giving away, transferring, purchasing, or receiving, any 
pistol at any place within the state “unless: (i) a license or permit is first 
obtained under this Article by the purchaser or receiver from the sheriff of the 
county in which the purchaser or receiver resides; or (ii) a valid North Carolina 
concealed handgun permit is held.”13 Permits received from the sheriff’s office 
are valid for five years and allow for one pistol per permit.14 
To obtain a permit, an individual must submit an application electronically 
to the sheriff’s office in the applicant’s county of residence and satisfy three 
requirements.15 First, the applicant must pass a criminal background check in 
which the sheriff checks with the State Bureau of Investigation and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation by conducting a check through the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) and “a criminal history check 
through the Administrative Office of the Courts.”16 Second, the applicant must 
“fully satisf[y]” the sheriff of their good moral character via affidavits, oral 
evidence, or otherwise.17 Finally, the applicant must “fully satisf[y]” the sheriff 
that their desire to possess a handgun is for “(i) the protection of the home, 
business, person, family or property, (ii) target shooting, (iii) collecting, or (iv) 
hunting.”18 Each permit application must include five dollars for each permit 
requested, a copy of government-issued identification, proof of residency, and 
a signed release form that authorizes and requires disclosure to the sheriff of 
any court orders concerning the mental health or capacity of the applicant.19 In 
Wake County, this disclosure can only be effective if signed while physically 
present in the sheriff’s office. Compounding the difficulty of this requirement, 
applications are not considered “submitted” until the release form is signed. 
After an application is submitted, the sheriff’s office has fourteen days to 
respond with a denial or approval of the permit.20 The statute further lists 
 
 10. Id. § 3, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws at 398. 
 11. Id. 
 12. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 14-402 to 14-409 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). 
 13. Id. § 14-402(a) (LEXIS). 
 14. Id. § 14-403 (LEXIS). 
 15. Id. § 14-404(a) (LEXIS). 
 16. Id. § 14-404(a)(1) (LEXIS). 
 17. Id. § 14-404(a)(2) (LEXIS). 
 18. Id. § 14-404(a)(3) (LEXIS). 
 19. Id. § 14-404(e1)(2)–(5) (LEXIS). 
 20. Id. § 14-404(f) (LEXIS). 
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conditions for automatic denials of permits, 21  which mirror the criteria of 
federally prohibited firearm possessors.22 Furthermore, the statute allows the 
sheriff to decline permit issue “for good cause shown” if the requirements are 
not “fully satisfied.”23 Overall, “good moral character” and “desire . . . [for] 
possession” are the only additional requirements posed by the North Carolina 
permit system when compared to federal law.24 If the sheriff issues a denial, the 
sheriff must provide a written refusal containing the specific facts upon which 
the sheriff concluded that the applicant was not qualified.25 Post-denial, the 
only available avenue for relief is an appeal to the superior court, where the 
court will evaluate the reasonableness of the sheriff’s refusal.26 
In summary, any time an individual seeks to lawfully gain possession of a 
pistol—including purchasing, gifting, or transferring—one must apply to the 
sheriff’s office; pay five dollars; and satisfy all the statutory requirements, many 
of which are subjective in nature. These requirements, however, did not arise 
from concern for public safety but rather were motivated by a desire to inhibit 
minorities from arming themselves. 
B. Underlying Racial Motivations of Gun Control and Permitting Schemes 
Despite claims to the contrary, 27 the racial (and racist) history of the 
United States has directly influenced the development of modern gun-control 
laws.28 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court itself in its infamous Scott v. Sanford29 
decision denied citizenship to Black people, in part, because granting citizenship 
would “give to persons of the negro race . . . full liberty . . . to keep and carry 
arms wherever they went.” 30  In similar fashion, North Carolina began its 
 
 21. See id. § 14-404(c) (LEXIS). 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). 
 23. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-404(b) (LEXIS). 
 24. Compare id. § 14-404(a), (c) (LEXIS) (stating that a sheriff must be fully satisfied of an 
applicant’s good moral character before issuing a permit), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (containing no moral 
character requirement for possession of a firearm). 
 25. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-404(b) (LEXIS). 
 26. Id. (LEXIS). 
 27. See, e.g., Ladd Everitt, Debunking the ‘Gun Control Is Racist’ Smear, WAGING NONVIOLENCE 
(Sept. 16, 2010), https://wagingnonviolence.org/2010/09/debunking-the-gun-control-is-racist-smear/ 
[https://perma.cc/URW6-499F] (arguing that gun control was enacted not to discriminate against 
minorities but instead to provide for the public’s safety). 
 28. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of The Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right To 
Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (2010) (documenting the United States’ lengthy history 
of withholding gun ownership rights from “non-American ‘others,’ including noncitizens, especially 
when citizenship is racially defined”). 
 29. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 30. Id. at 404. 
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journey to disarm Black residents in an act of 1840,31 under which free men of 
color were restricted from carrying firearms and from which White men were 
exempt.32 Following a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina upheld the act, finding no constitutional issue since (1) “free people of 
color cannot be considered as citizens” and (2) it is necessary to “preserve the 
peace and safety of the community from being disturbed by an indiscriminate 
use [of firearms] . . . by free men of color.”33 
After the Civil War, “Blacks were routinely disarmed by Southern 
States.” 34  Many southern states enacted Black Codes, which contained 
provisions prohibiting freed slaves from possessing or carrying firearms. 35 
These codes were found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment after its 
ratification in 1868 because the Constitution required that gun control laws be 
racially neutral. 36 States circumvented this requirement by enacting various 
discriminatory cost-based prohibitions, such as permitting schemes or by only 
allowing for the purchase of expensive handguns. 37  Some states banned 
handguns altogether, yet allowed exceptions for sheriffs and their “special 
deputies”—a euphemism for White men.38 And “[a]s Jim Crow intensified, 
other Southern states enacted gun registration and handgun permit laws.”39 
However, racially charged gun-control permitting schemes were not 
limited to the South. In 1911, in response to a brazen murder-suicide,40 New 
 
 31. An Act to Prevent Free Persons of Colour from Carrying Fire-Arms, 1840–1841 N.C. Sess. 
Laws ch. 30, 61 (codified at N.C. REV. CODE ch. 107, § 66 (1855)), repealed by N.C. CONST. of 1868, 
art. IV, § 24; State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250, 252 (1844).  
 32. See id. 
 33. Newsom, 27 N.C. at 254–55. 
 34. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008). 
 35. See David B. Kopel, The Klan’s Favorite Law, REASON (Feb. 15, 2005), 
https://reason.com/2005/02/15/the-klans-favorite-law/ [https://perma.cc/U78U-TRWX] [hereinafter 
Kopel, Klan’s Favorite Law]. See generally JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REP. 
OF THE J. COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, at 229 (1st Sess. 1866) (noting that freedmen’s weapons 
were being seized routinely in South Carolina); PARIS ANTI-SLAVERY CONF., SPECIAL REPORT OF 
THE PARIS ANTI-SLAVERY CONFERENCE, at 82 (1867) (stating that freedmen “were forbidden to own 
or bear fire-arms, and thus were rendered defenseless against assault”). 
 36. David Kopel & Joseph Greenlee, The Racist Origin of Gun Control Laws, HILL (Aug. 22, 
2017, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/347324-the-racist-origin-of-gun-
control-laws [https://perma.cc/6TSF-YT7F]. 
 37. Id.; Kopel, Klan’s Favorite Law, supra note 35. 
 38. AM. C.R. UNION, THE TRUTH ABOUT GUN CONTROL, RACISM AND GENOCIDE 15 (1st 
ed. 2015) (noting “special deputies” was nothing but a euphemism for “company goons” and the Ku 
Klux Klan). 
 39. Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 36 (noting that permit schemes were passed in Missouri in 1919 
and in Arkansas in 1923). 
 40. Michael A. Walsh, Opinion, The Strange Birth of NY’s Gun Laws, N.Y. POST (Jan. 16, 2012, 
5:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2012/01/16/the-strange-birth-of-nys-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5BXR-KX6S]. 
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York passed the Sullivan Act,41 which required a license to possess a concealed 
firearm.42 Overall, enforcement of the Act was largely discriminatory,43 and 
many questioned the sponsoring senator’s motives given his extensive 
involvement in the New York crime world.44 
Similar to North Carolina’s permit system, Florida enacted a licensing 
scheme in 189345 that required a license to carry or possess a pistol or rifle (“the 
Florida permit system”).46 The Florida permit system subsequently became the 
focus of litigation.47 Concurring in the dismissal of an alleged violation of the 
Florida permit system, Florida Supreme Court Justice Buford claimed the 
Florida permit system was unconstitutional, especially when considering its 
historical context.48 Justice Buford noted that the main purpose of the Florida 
permit system was to “disarm[] the negro laborers . . . [and that t]he statute was 
never intended to be applied to the white population and in practice has never 
been so applied.”49 
Although many of these laws appear racially neutral on their face, often 
“selective enforcement made them racist in practice.”50 And while not the focus 
of this Comment, many propose that federal gun control enacted in the 1960s 
was also rooted in racism—indicating that not even federal gun control has 
escaped its racist roots.51 Overall, despite the North Carolina permit system 
appearing racially neutral on its face, when taken in context with the actions of 
surrounding states and the attitudes regarding minorities at the time of 
 
 41. Act of July 20, 1965, 1965 N.Y. Laws 2343 (codified as amended in scattered codes of the 
N.Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS). 
 42. Id. § 400.00, 1967 N.Y. Laws at 2472–77. 
 43. See AM. C.R. UNION, supra note 38, at 16; see also The Rossi Pistol Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
29, 1911), https://www.nytimes.com/1911/09/29/archives/the-rossi-pistol-case.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8LMZ-K889 (dark archive)] (documenting how the judge presiding over the first conviction under the 
Sullivan Act made note of how “it was the custom of [Rossi, an Italian immigrant] and his hot-headed 
countrymen to have weapons concealed upon their persons”). 
 44. Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, the Shot That Spurred New York’s Gun-Control Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/100-years-ago-the-shot-
that-spurred-new-yorks-gun-control-law/ [https://perma.cc/XPF8-4KW3 (dark archive)]. 
 45. An Act to Regulate the Carrying of Firearms, ch. 4147, 1893 Fla. Laws 71 (1893) (codified as 
amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (Westlaw through Ch. 184 (End) of the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of 
the 26th Leg.)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. 1941). 
 48. Id. at 703 (Buford, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. 
 50. AM. C.R. UNION, supra note 38, at 15. 
 51. See Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[https://perma.cc/92BF-C2GC (dark archive)]. For example, the push to ban “Saturday-night specials” 
(selling cheaper guns often made of a lower quality metal alloy) was similarly rooted in racism with the 
aim of keeping poor Blacks from acquiring handguns. See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic 
Discrimination: The Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 794–95 (1995). 
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enactment, the permit system’s intention was to keep minorities from 
possessing handguns.52 
That finding is unremarkable considering that even into the mid-to-late 
1900s, gun control was routinely enacted to suppress minorities.53 Professor 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram argues that gun control was a continued mark of 
“second-class or inferior citizenship” based upon discriminatory beliefs of 
perceived “danger to . . . citizen population[s] from immigrants.”54 In fact, even 
the National Rifle Association supported gun-control legislation—in stark 
contrast to its position today—to disarm the Black Panthers in the 1960s.55 
Compounding the impact of this treatment is the fact that Black 
Americans are disproportionately affected by gun violence. 56 As a result of 
discriminatory gun-control schemes, those most in need of adequate self-
defense means are, and historically have been, those most inhibited from 
acquiring them. 
II.  HELLER AND MCDONALD 
The Second Amendment, ratified in 1791, secures the right of the “people 
to keep and bear arms.”57 Key to any Second Amendment evaluation are the 
principles outlined in both District of Columbia v. Heller58 and McDonald v. City 
of Chicago.59 This section provides a thorough summary and review of both cases 
in order to set the background for evaluating the North Carolina permit system. 
At issue in Heller was a District of Columbia code which generally 
prohibited the possession of handguns.60 The Supreme Court, in striking down 
the code, held that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right 
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”61 Justice Scalia, writing 
 
 52. North Carolina’s racist history is not limited to guns. During the Jim Crow era, major Ku 
Klux Klan riots occurred in Wilmington, Fayetteville, Winston Salem, and New Bern. Peter Bean, 
Fellow Examines Life in North Carolina Under Jim Crow, WILSON CTR. (June 3, 2004), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fellow-examines-life-north-carolina-under-jim-crow 
[https://perma.cc/5TYU-ZRZ2]. In addition, North Carolina was firmly in the hands of Democrats 
who kept schools segregated until 1954. See id. 
 53. See Gulasekaram, supra note 28, at 1561. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Thad Morgan, The NRA Supported Gun Control When the Black Panthers Had the Weapons, 
HISTORY (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/black-panthers-gun-control-nra-support-
mulford-act [https://perma.cc/DN4C-3Z6Y]. 
 56. Nick Cotter, Black Communities Are Disproportionately Hurt by Gun Violence. We Can’t Ignore 
Them, PUB. SOURCE, https://projects.publicsource.org/pittsburgh-gun-violence-1/ [https://perma.cc/ 
756M-WHYK]. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 58. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 59. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75. 
 61. Id. at 592. Part of this analysis included a breakdown of both the prefatory and operative 
clause of the Second Amendment. Id. at 577–78. The Court determined that the right to keep and bear 
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for the majority, rejected the constitutionality of a total ban on the possession 
of handguns on the grounds that the ban amounted to “a prohibition of an entire 
class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for . . . lawful 
purpose[s].”62 In addition, the Court took issue with the handgun prohibition 
extending to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property 
is most acute.”63 While never directly stating a level of scrutiny to apply to 
future Second Amendment cases, the Court weighed indirectly on the issue: 
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” 
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of 
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting 
upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of 
its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights 
are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the 
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even 
future judges think that scope too broad.64 
The Court went on to note that the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home “surely elevates above all 
other interests.”65 Finally, the Court noted that the opinion should not cast 
doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”66 “Taken as a whole, . . . [Heller 
holds:] first, that individuals have a constitutional right to protect themselves 
with usable firearms, and that this right is at its strongest in the home; [and] 
second, that some burdens upon individual Second Amendment rights are 
presumptively lawful.”67 
 
arms—the operative clause—was not limited by the prefatory clause, but rather, the prefatory clause 
explained the function of the right. Id. at 577. While some argue that the Second Amendment only 
applies to the “militia,” elsewhere in the Constitution the use of “‘the people’ . . . unambiguously refers 
to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Id. at 580. Furthermore, the 
“‘militia’ in colonial America consisted of a subset of ‘the people’—those who were male, able bodied, 
and within a certain age range.” Id. As Heller makes patently clear, treating the right as only protecting 
arms in an organized militia “fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that 
right as ‘the people.’” Id. at 580–81. 
 62. Id. at 628. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 634–35. 
 65. Id. at 635. 
 66. Id. at 626–27. 
 67. Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of 
Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1052 (2014). 
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Only a few years later, in McDonald, the Supreme Court made clear that 
the Second Amendment applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment.68 
The Court specifically rejected the view that the Second Amendment “should 
be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment.” 69  In 
addition, the Court also touched on the possible impact on states: as with any 
incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights, “[t]he enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table [for 
states].”70 Overall, McDonald serves to reinforce the principles of Heller, but 
similarly falls short in establishing firm guidelines for lower courts to follow. 
What remains clear after both cases is that full-blown prohibitions, or laws with 
the effect of prohibition, are not constitutional. 
Some courts understand Heller and McDonald to imply that Second 
Amendment cases should be evaluated using strict scrutiny,71 while other courts 
use heightened scrutiny (falling somewhere between intermediate and strict).72 
Unfortunately, given the lack of clarity in both decisions, the Court has left 
lower courts mostly to their own devices in determining the proper standard of 
review. 73  While not overwhelmingly helpful, “[t]he Heller majority and 
McDonald plurality suggested that a historical inquiry could help determine the 
scope of the Second Amendment right.”74 However, the implementation of this 
historical test varies dramatically by court. While many courts refuse altogether 
to state what level of scrutiny they are using, of those that do, the most common 
scrutiny level is intermediate.75 
 
 68. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 745–46. 
 70. Id. at 790. 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009) (“[W]here 
fundamental rights are at stake, strict scrutiny is to be applied.”). Under strict scrutiny, a law must be 
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 
(1997). 
 72. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This necessarily means 
that the City bears the burden of justifying its action under some heightened standard of judicial 
review.”). 
 73. Colvin, supra note 67, at 1083. 
 74. Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. 
L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2011). 
 75. See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 45–46 (2019); Kiehl, supra note 74, at 1145. Under intermediate 
scrutiny, the law must serve an important governmental objective and the means employed must be 
“substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982)). 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
2021] MISFIRE: NORTH CAROLINA MISSES THE MARK 539 
III.  POST-HELLER/MCDONALD 
Generally, courts have adopted a two-part test to evaluate Second 
Amendment challenges post-Heller/McDonald.76 First, “courts ask whether the 
challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.” 77 
Second, courts ask whether, under some type of means-end scrutiny, the law is 
constitutional. 78  In evaluating the first prong, courts employ an “original 
meaning criteria,” focusing on the text and history of the right.79 Part of this 
prong is an analysis regarding whether the challenged law is presumptively 
lawful. 80  Courts have struggled with how to interpret the “presumptively 
lawful” dicta from Heller over the years, leading to a variety of methods.81 
Relevant to some courts’ analysis is whether laws are still in place; a law 
which is later repealed cannot be said to be long standing.82 Furthermore, other 
courts have gone as far as to put the burden of proof on the government to show 
that the restriction was in effect “around 1791 and 1868,” when the Second 
Amendment was enacted and then made binding on the states.83 Additionally, 
“[t]he only laws that the lower courts have held to be long-standing were 
initially enacted in the nineteenth century.”84 Finally, even if a law is found to 
be long standing and presumptively lawful, a plaintiff may rebut this argument 
by showing the regulation has more than a “de minimis effect upon his right.”85 
Courts struggle further under the second prong, unable to determine 
which level of scrutiny to apply given the lack of guidance in Heller.86 For many 
courts, the distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny turns on 
whether or not the challenged regulation inhibits the possession of arms within 
 
 76. PECK, supra note 75, at 12. Hereinafter this test will be referred to as the “two-part test.” The 
two-part test arose due to the lack of guidance post-Heller/McDonald. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 13. 
 79. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno, 
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–02 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 80. PECK, supra note 75, at 14. 
 81. Id. at 13–15. For example, some courts look to the history discussed in Heller and attempt to 
draw parallels to the challenged regulation. Id. at 13. Other courts find the language in Heller relatively 
useless and focus more on why the Supreme Court designated certain restrictions as presumptively 
lawful. See id. at 15. Courts have struggled to determine whether presumptively lawful regulations are 
lawful because they withstand analysis under strict scrutiny (or any level of scrutiny) or because such 
regulations fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment entirely. Id. Finally, other courts reject 
the presumptively lawful portion of the test altogether, finding it too similar to the rational basis test. 
Id. at 14–15. 
 82. David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 335 (2016) [hereinafter Kopel, Background Checks]. 
 83. Id. at 334 (quoting Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d 927, 963 (E.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d on 
other grounds, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 84. Id. at 335. 
 85. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 86. PECK, supra note 75, at 16. 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
540 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
the home.87 For others, the distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny 
is determined by “consider[ing] the nature of the conduct being regulated and 
the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.” 88 The Seventh 
Circuit employs yet another distinct approach, requiring that the government 
make a “rigorous showing” to justify the regulation when the firearm restriction 
implicates core Second Amendment rights, such as the ability to possess a 
handgun in the home.89 Under this standard of review, the court evaluates “the 
strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the 
exercise of Second Amendment rights.” 90  This rigorous showing may be 
“something close to strict scrutiny,” if not strict scrutiny.91 
Courts utilizing the intermediate scrutiny test seem to be doing exactly 
the kind of interest balancing that Heller prohibited.92 For example, the Fourth 
Circuit justified its refusal to extend Second Amendment rights due to the 
court’s fears of being “minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of 
mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to 
Second Amendment rights.”93 Unfortunately, this disregard for precedent in 
favor of more “likable” outcomes is not limited to the Fourth Circuit. 
Constitutional professor and scholar Allen Rostron contends that Justice 
Breyer’s balancing test has become the law of the land as lower courts routinely 
and regularly disregard Heller, which specifically rejected such a balancing 
test. 94  Professor Robert Cottrol contends that appellate courts are simply 
applying, at best, a weakened intermediate scrutiny and possibly even a rational-
basis-plus standard.95 In addition, the legitimacy of the two-part test as a whole 
 
 87. See Kiehl, supra note 74, at 1145–46. 
 88. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 
2013). This distinction is largely pulled from First Amendment law, which is unsurprising given 
Heller’s comparisons between the rights. See PECK, supra note 75, at 16. 
 89. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 90. Id. at 703. 
 91. PECK, supra note 75, at 13. 
 92. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). While some might argue that Heller itself performed interest balancing in holding that 
certain long-standing regulations were acceptable, the rationale for that holding is found in the lengthy 
historical practice of the regulations, not their interests to society. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n 
v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1540–41 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (discussing 
how history supported certain laws restricting the right to access firearms).  
 93. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 94. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 757 (2012); see also Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1867 (“With what other 
constitutional right would this Court allow such blatant defiance of its precedent?”). 
 95. Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment, Constitutional Dysfunction or Necessary Safeguard?, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 837, 841 (2014). 
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has been called into question by multiple sitting Supreme Court Justices. 96 
Dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas pointed out how lower 
courts are “minimiz[ing] . . . [Heller and McDonald’s] framework” by employing 
an “entirely made up” test that does not comport with any long-standing notion 
of constitutional law.97 Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he Second 
Amendment provides no hierarchy of ‘core’ and peripheral rights,” nor do any 
precedents support the application of the binary test.98 
While he was a judge for the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh took issue 
with a similar, incorrect application of Heller’s principles.99 In Heller v. District 
of Columbia (“Heller II”),100 the majority used intermediate scrutiny to uphold a 
law requiring the registration of handguns as well as a prohibition on certain 
semi-automatic rifles.101 Justice Kavanaugh, in dissent, opined that the proper 
test to apply is a “text, history, and tradition” standard.102 In other words, “[t]he 
scope of the right is thus determined by ‘historical justifications’ . . . [a]nd 
tradition.” 103  Given Justice Kavanaugh’s recent appointment to the United 
States Supreme Court, there is a real possibility that this standard of review 
will be used in future Second Amendment challenges. Therefore, this Comment 
will apply both the common two-part test and the Kavanaugh test to North 
Carolina’s permitting scheme. 
IV.  NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD REPEAL ITS PISTOL-PURCHASE PERMIT 
SYSTEM AS IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE SECOND AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AND IS NOT A SENSIBLE POLICY 
The North Carolina permit system does not pass constitutional muster 
under the Second Amendment, failing both the two-part test as well as the 
Kavanaugh test. This holds true under both intermediate and strict scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the permit system is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 
Finally, the permit system should be repealed because it is largely ineffective. 
 
 96. Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1867 (2020); see also Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (per curiam) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I share Justice Alito’s concern that some federal and state courts may not 
be properly applying Heller and McDonald.”). 
 97. Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1866–67. 
 98. Id. at 1867. 
 99. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 100. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (majority opinion). 
 101. Id. at 1257, 1262, 1264. 
 102. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (rejecting an interest balancing approach where judges 
can “re-calibrate the scope of the Second Amendment”). 
 103. Id. at 1272. 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
542 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
A. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Unconstitutional Under 
the Second Amendment as It Fails the Common Two-Part Test 
1.  The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Fails Prong One 
The first prong of the test asks whether the law implicates the Second 
Amendment and whether it is presumptively lawful.104 The pistol permitting 
scheme implicates the Second Amendment as it creates a waiting period 
through its approval process and medical release form signing period. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has found that a ten-day waiting period alone 
implicates the Second Amendment.105 Surely the combination of a permitting 
scheme that effectively creates a waiting period while waiting to sign medical 
release forms and while approval is pending also implicates the Second 
Amendment. In practice, the date from which one decides to purchase a 
handgun and the date of final approval of the permits could be months apart.106 
In addition, the permitting system directly affects one’s ability to acquire a 
handgun. As “[o]ne cannot exercise the right to keep and bear arms without 
actually possessing a firearm,”107 access to arms is a necessary precondition to 
exercising the right. Limiting access to a traditionally popular and accessible 
firearm directly implicates the Second Amendment.108 
In applying the two-part test to determine whether the challenged 
regulation implicates the Second Amendment, courts will also ask if the 
regulation is presumptively lawful as a long-standing regulation.109 To answer 
this, courts look to history and tradition, specifically as they relate to permitting 
systems.110 Traditionally, systems requiring that a person receive permission 
from the government before buying or borrowing a firearm have been rare in 
the United States. 111  Leading up to the Civil War, several states enacted 
legislation prohibiting Black persons from possessing firearms without a 
 
 104. PECK, supra note 75, at 45. 
 105. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 827 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 106. See, e.g., infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text (describing delays of up to five weeks in 
Wake County). 
 107. Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d, 927, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 
816 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 108. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The 
Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. 
L. REV. 429, 460 (2014) (explaining that “Heller suggests that the Second Amendment protects 
weapons that are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”). 
 109. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 110. See id. (upholding a registration requirement as presumptively lawful given the history). 
While I find the holding in this case to be an erroneous application of the standards described in Heller, 
it nevertheless acts as an example of how courts have typically justified a law as presumptively lawful 
by looking to history and tradition. 
 111. Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 304.  
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license.112 In North Carolina, all free persons of color had to acquire an annual 
license in order to own or carry firearms.113 
Following the Civil War and in the early twentieth century, isolated 
racially neutral permitting schemes came into effect to prevent freedmen from 
acquiring means to defend themselves—the North Carolina permit system 
among them.114 Similarly, Missouri enacted a permitting system in 1921 for the 
sale of handguns, but it has since been repealed.115 Overall handgun purchase 
permits were required by the following states: “New York (1911), Oregon (1913, 
repealed 1925), North Carolina (1919), Missouri (1921, repealed 2007), 
Connecticut (1923), Michigan (1927, partially repealed by several steps in early 
twenty-first century), Hawaii (1927), New Jersey (1927), and Texas (1931, later 
declared void).”116 Thus, only a total of six states currently have permit systems 
in place as holdovers from the Jim Crow era.117 The majority of state gun laws 
of the early 1900s were less restrictive than the permitting systems put in place 
in the minority of states listed above.118 
There is little possibility that the North Carolina permit system is 
presumptively lawful as a long-standing regulation. The regulation came about 
in the twentieth century, and was not a common one at that.119 “Permission laws 
were the exception, not the norm, in the early twentieth century.”120 Both the 
timing of the regulation, and the fact that it was, and remains, uncommon are 
factors that cut against finding the permit system a traditional long-standing 
regulation. Furthermore, of the few states which have enacted such permitting 
schemes, over half have been repealed or partially repealed. 121 This further 
reduces the possibility that the permits are a long-standing regulation.122 While 
the antiquated North Carolina permit system is still on the books, there is little 
support left for such permitting requirements. In addition, given the racial 
connotations of the permitting schemes discussed above in Section I.B, it is 
unlikely that any modern court would seek to uphold a system rooted in Jim 
Crow era discriminatory practices. Finally, the North Carolina permit system 
was enacted in 1919—well within the time frame that courts have found to be 
 
 112. Id. at 337. 
 113. Id. at 338. 
 114. See id. at 342–46. 
 115. Id. at 345. 
 116. Id. at 360–61. 
 117. Id. at 361. 
 118. See id. at 362. 
 119. See supra notes 114–17. 
 120. Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 340.  
 121. Id. at 360–61. 
 122. Id. at 335. 
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too late to be established as long-standing. 123  Overall, the North Carolina 
permitting system satisfies the first prong of the common two-part test. 
2.  The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Fails Prong Two 
Next, under the second prong, the court must determine whether the 
pistol permit scheme is unconstitutional under some means-end scrutiny.124 
First, the court must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.125 
Generally, “[l]aws that neither implicate the core protections of the Second 
Amendment nor substantially burden their exercise do not receive heightened 
scrutiny.” 126  Rather, “[h]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those 
restrictions that . . . operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding 
citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful 
purposes).”127 The scope of the legislative restriction as well as the availability 
of alternative solutions factor into the analysis of determining the burden the 
challenged law places on the right.128 However, strict scrutiny may not apply if 
the burden does not constrain the Second Amendment’s core area of 
protection. 129  As evidenced by Heller, rational basis is inapplicable. 130 
Therefore, at a minimum, the court will employ intermediate scrutiny. 
However, Heller and McDonald strongly suggest that applying intermediate 
scrutiny to laws that categorically limit the Second Amendment is 
inappropriate.131 Despite this, federal circuits routinely employ intermediate 
scrutiny to Second Amendment cases.132 
To resolve these issues, courts should evaluate the North Carolina permit 
system under strict scrutiny. Heller and McDonald suggest that no interest-
balancing approach should be used.133 An inhibition on the ability to acquire a 
 
 123. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that regulation on 
large capacity magazines was not considered long-standing given that the regulation emerged in 1927 
and had almost been entirely repealed); Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2015) 
(finding a statute enacted in 1909 too recent to be considered long-standing); Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. 
Supp. 3d, 927, 963 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding a statute enacted in 1923 to be too late to be considered 
long-standing), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 124. PECK, supra note 75, at 13. 
 125. See id. at 15. 
 126. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 127. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 128. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 259. 
 129. Id. at 260. “If a law regulating arms adversely affects a law-abiding citizen’s right of defense 
of hearth and home, that law strikes at the core Second Amendment right.” Duncan v. Becerra, 970 
F.3d 1133, 1152 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963 
(9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a challenged law “[o]n its face . . . implicates the core because it applies 
to law-abiding citizens and imposes restrictions on the use of handguns within the home”). 
 130. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). 
 131. Adam P. Soloperto, A Standard of Review for Gun Rights: The Second Amendment Question Hot 
as a Two-Dollar Pistol, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 231 (2016). 
 132. PECK, supra note 75, at 45–46. 
 133. See supra Part II. 
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handgun for the defense of oneself in the home, which the North Carolina 
permit system does, hits at the very core of the Second Amendment. For 
example, under the Seventh Circuit’s standards, rigorous scrutiny, which some 
equate to strict scrutiny, would be employed since the permit system directly 
affects one’s ability to purchase a handgun for use in the home.134 One must go 
through the burdensome process of applying to the sheriff’s office, pay a fee for 
every permit, go to the sheriff’s office to sign health release records, wait for 
approval, and return to the sheriff’s office to pick up the permits to simply 
acquire a handgun. Therefore, without going through the time-consuming 
process, one is left defenseless in their home. 135  Furthermore, even when 
following the burdensome procedures to legally acquire a handgun, the 
significant delay caused by the archaic system means that an applicant is also 
left defenseless during the entire timeline of the application. “A burden on the 
core of [a] right undermines the very purpose for its codification.”136 The North 
Carolina permit system is a burden to the core of the Second Amendment. It 
poses a direct inhibition on the ability of North Carolinians to (1) acquire 
handguns, (2) exercise their fundamental right to self-defense, and (3) own and 
possess firearms inside their house. 137  As the system was likely enacted to 
deprive Black Americans of their core civil rights, the result of the analysis is 
unsurprising. 138 In addition, similar to the prohibition in Heller, the North 
Carolina permit system’s impact is not limited to the public arena. Instead, the 
effects “extend[], moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.”139 
Those in favor of intermediate scrutiny might argue that because long 
guns140 are available without a permit, the core of the Second Amendment is 
not burdened since citizens still possess the ability to bear arms for defense in 
their homes. However, Heller indicated that the presence of alternatives will 
not excuse an infringement.141 Furthermore, the government may not “treat the 
right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different 
 
 134. See supra Part III. 
 135. See supra Section I.A. 
 136. Klukowski, supra note 108, at 467. 
 137. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that a ban on large 
capacity magazines implicated the core of the Second Amendment protections because it restricted the 
ability to both buy and possess large capacity magazines in the home as well as limited the right of self-
defense). 
 138. See supra Section I.B. For more information on statutes enacted to discriminate against Black 
Americans, see generally A Brief History, supra note 1. 
 139. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 140. Without delving into the intricate and often confusing definitions of various firearms under 
federal law, for purposes of this Comment, “long guns” refers to rifles and shotguns. In other words, 
guns readily available for purchase outside of the scope of the North Carolina permit system. 
 141. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban 
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”). 
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body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.”142 We also know that 
laws burdening fundamental rights are generally subject to strict scrutiny.143 In 
addition, it is imperative that courts not define the Second Amendment so 
narrowly as to give inadequate effect to the right.144 Any attempt to evaluate 
the permit system under intermediate scrutiny would be an attempt to subject 
the Second Amendment to second-class treatment compared to other rights. 
That second-class treatment came to fruition in Kwong v. Bloomberg, 145 
where the Second Circuit upheld a pistol licensing scheme in New York.146 The 
licensing scheme, which prohibited ownership of handguns without a license 
and associated fee payment, was upheld by analogy to First Amendment fee 
jurisprudence. 147  However, in upholding the licensing scheme, the Second 
Circuit failed to acknowledge the crucial difference between possessing a 
handgun in the home and conducting a parade or a rally: handgun possession is 
conducted in the privacy of the home while parades and similar forms of 
expression are conducted in public spaces that often require police presence, 
public sanitation, and road closures.148 The Second Circuit failed to recognize 
this distinction and even failed to reconcile the plethora of First Amendment 
activities that do not require a fee or license.149 The court’s comparison of a 
handgun purchase for the home, which has no relation to carrying arms in public 
or to parades and rallies is severely flawed. A more apt comparison to First 
Amendment activity would be an analogy to owning a book in the home or 
placing a sign on one’s property.150 Instead, the court’s logic suggests that almost 
 
 142. McDonald v. City of Chicago., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 143. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 144. See Klukowski, supra note 108, at 466. 
 145. 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 146. Id. at 172. 
 147. Id. at 165 (“The Supreme Court's ‘fee jurisprudence’ has historically addressed the 
constitutionality of fees charged by governmental entities on expressive activities protected by the First 
Amendment—such as fees charged to hold a rally or parade. Two district court decisions that have 
considered the issue in the wake of Heller and McDonald have used the same analytical framework to 
consider similar claims involving the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) ("The obvious advantage of 
requiring application for a permit was noted as giving the public authorities notice in advance so as to 
afford opportunity for proper policing. And the court further observed that, in fixing time and place, 
the license served ‘to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient 
use of the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder.'"). 
 149. There are many examples of First Amendment activities that do not require a fee or license. 
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
However, the Kwong court failed to acknowledge any of these examples. 
 150. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) ("Residential signs are an unusually 
cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited 
mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
565 (1969) (recognizing that the First Amendment strongly protects the right of one to "read or observe 
what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
home"). 
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any fee in the Second Amendment context is constitutional because there are 
constitutional fees for some First Amendment activities. 151 Furthermore, the 
Second Circuit also failed to address wait times associated with the licensing 
system and instead chose to focus on the associated fee to determine that no 
substantial burden was imposed on the Second Amendment right.152  
Overall, the application of Kwong today is relatively limited. 153  The 
decision primarily relied on First Amendment fee jurisprudence in the context 
of an undue burden analysis incorporated from abortion jurisprudence.154 This 
undue burden analysis has been rarely used and fallen out of favor among the 
circuits for the more-developed two-part test described in this Comment.155 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the court even used intermediate scrutiny.156 
At best, Kwong illustrates a flawed equivalence of protected activities under two 
different fundamental rights. 
The undrawn distinction between public activity and private ownership in 
Kwong is implicated by the North Carolina permit system—the permit system 
is not related to regulating the carrying of arms in the public but instead 
regulates access to ownership generally and, by extension, in the home. 
Therefore, a lesser level of scrutiny is inappropriate.157 
Support for this line of reasoning can be found in Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania,158 where the Supreme Court struck down a paid licensing scheme 
for solicitors. 159  In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the 
“provocative, abusive, and ill-mannered” nature of the literature being 
 
 151. See Kwong, 723 F.3d at 167–68 (“Indeed, the fact that the licensing regime makes the exercise 
of one's Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily mean that it ‘substantially 
burdens’ that right.”). 
 152. Id. at 165–66. 
 153. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 259 n.92 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(declining to apply Kwong and instead applying heightened scrutiny to an assault weapons ban).  
 154. Some question the applicability of fee jurisprudence generally in the Second Amendment 
context. See, e.g., Genesa Cefali, Is First Amendment Fee Jurisprudence the Right Approach to the Second 
Amendment?, DUKE U. CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (July 15, 2019), 
https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/07/15/is-first-amendment-fee-jurisprudence-the-
right-approach-to-the-second-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/WNG8-G744] (suggesting that First 
Amendment fee jurisprudence may not be the proper approach to firearm license fees today given the 
Second Amendment’s own relevant history). 
 155. See supra Part III. 
 156. Cottrol, supra note 95, at 839–40 (criticizing the Kwong decision, among others, as an example 
of “[c]ourts . . . applying, at most, a somewhat weak intermediate scrutiny, perhaps even a rational basis 
plus standard” to firearm restrictions). 
 157. See Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court To Do Post-McDonald, 
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 511 (2012) (discussing how some courts have drawn the line 
between intermediate and strict scrutiny as whether the regulation addresses arms in the home or the 
public). 
 158. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 159. Id. at 117. 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
548 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
distributed justified the license and associated fee. 160  It noted that the 
government may not suppress or tax the “dissemination of views because they 
are unpopular, annoying or distasteful.” 161  Similar to the content-based 
restrictions or justifications described above, these types of “arms-based,” 
discriminatory gun-control schemes seek to restrict and suppress politically 
disfavored weapons. The North Carolina permit system is an arms-based 
restriction since it only applies to handguns and therefore strict scrutiny should 
be used. 
While federal circuit courts would seem to overwhelmingly disagree with 
the conclusion that strict scrutiny should be used, that is not necessarily 
surprising. There is an apparent double standard present when comparing the 
treatment of the Second Amendment to other constitutional rights.162 Lower 
courts are defiantly resisting the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and 
McDonald, and “[c]ontinued refusal to hear Second Amendment cases [by the 
Supreme Court] only enables this kind of defiance.”163 The Supreme Court has 
“not clarified the standard for assessing Second Amendment claims for almost 
10 [years].” 164 The right to keep and bear arms is effectively the Supreme 
Court’s “constitutional orphan . . . [a]nd the lower courts seem to have gotten 
the message.”165 Recently some lower courts have begun to fall more in line with 
Justice Thomas’s views, as seen in Duncan v. Becerra,166 where a panel for the 
Ninth Circuit utilized strict scrutiny in striking down a large capacity magazine 
ban.167 
Under strict scrutiny, the law must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.”168 In addition, the law must be no more 
restrictive than necessary to achieve the purported governmental interest.169 
For “almost every gun-control regulation . . . [the government’s] primary 
concern . . . [is] the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.”170 In addition, 
the government has an interest in preventing crime. 171  In order to assess 
whether the pistol permit scheme would fail under strict scrutiny, it is useful to 
 
 160. Id. at 115–16. 
 161. Id. at 116. 
 162. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 951. 
 165. Id. at 952. 
 166. 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 167. Id. at 1152. 
 168. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997) (upholding the district court’s redistricting 
plan for Georgia’s congressional delegation). 
 169. Sobel, supra note 157, at 495. 
 170. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). 
 171. See id. 
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see what courts have struck down in other areas of constitutional rights law. 
“[T]he Ninth Circuit struck down a county’s 5-day waiting period for nude-
dancing licenses because it ‘unreasonably prevent[ed] a dancer from exercising 
first amendment rights while an application [was] pending.’”172 The Supreme 
Court has held that the First Amendment forbids a county from charging even 
a small permitting fee to offset the costs of providing security for a white-
nationalist rally. 173  Overall, it seems that the Court provides much greater 
protection to other, more “favorable” rights than the Second Amendment.174 
Holding the Second Amendment to the same level of favor, the North Carolina 
pistol permit scheme falls short of constitutionality under the Second 
Amendment as it imposes a waiting period and fee to exercise the right. 
While the government has compelling interests,175 the permitting system 
is not narrowly tailored—or even effective—to achieve those interests since the 
permitting system is overwhelmingly redundant with existing federal 
regulations. 176  In fact, the sheriff’s office utilizes the same exact NICS 
background check as would be performed without the permitting system in 
place.177 Some critics would argue that removing the permitting system would 
inhibit checking mental health records. However, in 2016, the Department of 
Health and Human Services modified the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)178 Privacy Rule to expressly permit the 
disclosure of the identities of individuals to NICS who, for mental health 
reasons, are prohibited from having a firearm.179 Therefore, the North Carolina 
permit system is redundant. 
 
 172. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(quoting Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1060 (1986)). 
 173. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136 (1992). 
 174. Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 951. 
 175. Public safety and crime prevention, among other interests, would easily be touted by the 
government in defending the permitting system. 
 176. See infra Section IV.D. 
 177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-404(a)(1) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (“The sheriff shall determine the criminal and background history of any 
applicant by . . . conducting a national criminal history records check, by conducting a check through 
[NICS] . . . and by conducting a criminal history check through the Administrative Office of the 
Courts.”). While some might argue that the added check of state level records is an additional 
safeguard, in practice, it is simply negligible if North Carolina responsibly reports criminal infractions 
to the FBI. Since state law disqualifiers mirror federal law disqualifiers, the federal system covers any 
legal disqualifiers, making the state-level check irrelevant. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
Unless, of course, the state-level check was being used to deny permits based off of “good cause” 
founded on mere charges or accusations alone, further highlighting the dangers of such subjective 
qualifiers. See infra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
 178. Pub. L. No. 141-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 179. HIPAA Privacy Rule and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
special-topics/nics/index.html [https://perma.cc/6934-UD7L]. 
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Furthermore, since implementation of the permit system varies by county, 
there is no single method of operation.180 “The law is not uniformly followed 
. . . nor is it enforced at the same rate.”181 County sheriffs also hold a large range 
of discretion, retaining the ability to deny one their constitutional right without 
substantial due process.182 This excessive amount of discretion seems to place 
North Carolinians’ constitutional rights in the hands of their county sheriff 
based on a subjective system that is susceptible to abuse.183 Such is the case in 
Henderson County, where Sheriff Charles McDonald openly admits he will 
sometimes deny a permit based off of criminal charges, despite the individual 
never being “convicted in court.”184 
This inconsistent application of the permit system creates opportunities 
for discrimination. “Even now, in many jurisdictions in which police 
departments have wide discretion in issuing firearm permits, the effect is that 
permits are rarely issued to poor or minority citizens.”185 When considering the 
racially charged past of gun control, especially in North Carolina, the potential 







 180. Joel Burgess, More Than 95 Percent of Local Pistol Permit Requests Approved, CITIZEN TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2016, 8:50 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2016/02/07/permit-law-
adding-more-gun-control/78755132/ [https://perma.cc/56J7-S832]. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. (describing how Sheriff Charles McDonald will deny a permit based on an applicant’s 
criminal charges despite the applicant never being “convicted in court”). 
 183. For an example of how such a system could be abused, we can look to New York, where the 
licensing system became a bribery system. Kaja Whitehouse, Ex-Cop: NYPD Gun License Division Was 
a Bribery Machine, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:31 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/04/17/ex-cop-nypd-
gun-license-division-was-a-bribery-machine/ [https://perma.cc/X3A9-ETNT] (describing how gun 
licenses were exchanged for money, prostitutes, watches, sports memorabilia, and vacations). “New 
York City requires residents to have a pistol permit to own a handgun legally, but the law is 
administered so stringently that virtually no residents of New York City other than retired police 
officers are able to get a permit.” Gary Kleck, Gun Control After Heller and McDonald: What Cannot 
Be Done and What Ought To Be Done, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1383, 1385 (2012). Less than one percent 
of New York City residents have obtained a license to allow them to possess a handgun. Id. at 1386. 
 184. See Burgess, supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 185. Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 67, 67 (1991). 
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Table 1186 
 Total Number 
of Applications 
Number of Permit 
Approvals 




37,340 28,552 8,788 
White Permit 
Applicants 
65,900 60,381 5,519 
 
Table 1 illustrates a breakdown of permit applications in Wake County by race 
from January 1, 2015, to December 3, 2020, and their associated approval or 
rejection rates. 
 
In practice, the Wake County Sheriff’s Office rejected 8.37% of White 
applicants, while rejecting 23.54% of Black applicants. This amounts to Black 
applicants experiencing a rejection rate of approximately three times the rate of 
White applicants. Given Wake County’s similar racial composition to that of 
North Carolina as a whole,187 Wake County potentially represents statewide 
trends. But while this data is certainly striking, the conclusions from it are 
limited. Without further research into the reasons for permit denials broken 
down by race, as well as data from all counties in North Carolina, definitive 
conclusions regarding racial biases present in the modern permit system are 
speculative. However, at a minimum, this data demonstrates the urgency for 
further investigation into this issue. 
A more recent example of the wanton implementation of the North 
Carolina permit system is Wake County Sherriff Baker (seemingly 
independently) announcing that the sheriff’s office would no longer be 
accepting applications due to backlog. 188  After several lawsuits were filed, 
Sherriff Baker ultimately reopened the application process, though more recent 
lawsuits have been filed over the significant delay in approving permits.189 In 
 
 186. Although Wake County maintains this information and it is considered public record, the 
data is not accessible online. In December 2020, I submitted a North Carolina Public Records Request 
asking for the data on permit rejections within Wake County. Wake County then provided this 
information to me. The data is on file with the North Carolina Law Review. 
 187. Compare Quick Facts: Wake County, North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/wakecountynorthcarolina/RHI225219#RHI225219 
[https://perma.cc/ZWD5-BFHB], with Quick Facts: North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC [https://perma.cc/Z3DH-QP2Y]. 
 188. Wake County Receiving ‘Unprecedented’ Number of Requests for Gun Permits, 
WRAL,  https://www.wral.com/coronavirus/group-files-third-lawsuit-against-wake-sheriff-over-gun-
permits/19220600/ [https://perma.cc/36KL-GYLN (staff-uploaded archive)] (Aug. 5, 2020, 8:41 AM). 
 189. See id. 
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Wake County, permit approvals can take as long as five weeks. 190  By 
comparison, turnaround times for permits in Nash and Johnston Counties are 
“just a few days.”191 
Mental health release forms compound this delay since permit applications 
are not considered complete until the release forms are signed during an 
appointment with the sheriff’s office.192 In Wake County, an applicant is left in 
limbo after completing the online portion of the permit application because they 
receive only a message that the sheriff’s office will reach out to them to set up 
an appointment. While not the same application process, a concealed carry 
application appointment availability can be a useful gauge of backlog, as these 
appointments are handled by the same department within the sheriff’s office. 
As of September 24, 2020, concealed carry application appointments were “fully 
booked” through January 2021.193 Theoretically, one could submit the online 
application and spend months waiting for an appointment to sign the medical 
release forms and only then, would the fourteen-day statutory time limit start. 
One might be thankful just to start the clock on the time limit, but some sheriffs 
have little regard for state law. For example, Wake County Sheriff Baker readily 
admits he is not complying with the fourteen-day time limitation because of 
increased numbers of applications.194 Despite violating state law, Sheriff Baker 
maintains he has not violated anyone’s Second Amendment rights. 195  This 
exemplifies the problem: North Carolinians should not be stuck with their 
Second Amendment rights in limbo because of archaic, inefficient, and costly 
gun-control schemes. 196  Nor should the ability to exercise one’s Second 
Amendment rights depend on one’s county of residence. 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. This difference in processing time very well may be a function of population differences. 
Even still, it exposes further flaws of the permit system that could be alleviated by simply following 
existing federal gun control. A citizen in Wake County should be able to enjoy their Second 
Amendment rights just as expeditiously as another citizen in Nash or Johnston County. 
 192. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 193. A.P. Dillon, Protest of Wake Sheriff over Continued Pistol Permit Delays Is Canceled, N. ST. J. 
(Sept. 24, 2020), http://nsjonline.com/article/2020/09/protest-wake-sheriff-continued-pistol-permit-
delays-canceled/ [https://perma.cc/R6FR-WSPE]. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. In the course of writing this Comment, I applied for a pistol permit through the North 
Carolina permit system. On September 25, 2020, I submitted my application packet online to the Wake 
County Sherriff’s Office. On October 27, 2020—thirty days later—my application was approved, and 
I was notified that I must call to make an appointment to show identification and sign the mental health 
waiver form to receive my pistol permit. When calling the Wake County Sherriff’s Office on multiple 
occasions, an automated message played notifying me that the office was busy with other formalities. 
At the end of the automated message the call automatically disconnected with no option to remain on 
hold. As of December 2020, I have not yet been able to reach the Wake County Sheriff’s Office to 
schedule an appointment, and I have not yet received my permit. However, my situation is not unique. 
Ashad Hajela, Wake County Sheriff Cuts Wait Time for Pistol Permits After Gun Rights Group Sued, NEWS 
& OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/article247020792.html [https://perma.cc/9SRH-
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While the goal of crime prevention is certainly compelling, the permit 
statute achieves nothing that federal law does not already cover—other than 
adding inconveniences and substantial burdens to the citizens of North Carolina 
who seek to exercise their Second Amendment rights. Furthermore, sheriff’s 
offices are limited in their hours of operation, making it exceedingly difficult 
and burdensome for working citizens to find the time to stop in on two separate 
occasions in order to receive a permit.197 In addition, citizens may even have to 
take unpaid time off from work in order to make multiple trips to accommodate 
the limited hours of operation.198 
Moreover, the scope of the permitting system seems overly broad. For 
example, even if a grandfather wanted to gift his heirloom pistol to his 
grandson, his grandson would have to jump through the burdensome and 
unnecessary hoops of acquiring a pistol permit.199 
Overall, the pistol purchase permit scheme falls short of satisfying strict 
scrutiny when challenged under the Second Amendment. This is mostly due to 
the scheme’s redundancy with existing federal gun control laws. When viewed 
in light of existing laws, the critical flaws of the permitting scheme are apparent: 
(1) an inability to handle the volume of applications during periods of high 
demand; and (2) the lack of any significant, measurable advantage to accompany 
its increased burdens.200 If federal law can achieve the same result with far less 
burden, without placing citizens in lengthy periods of backlog, and without the 
potential for racial biases to influence the process, the North Carolina permit 
system can hardly be said to be narrowly tailored. 201 Sheriff Baker himself 
 
R2WF (staff-uploaded dark archive)] (explaining that some applicants have waited up to “70 days” for 
the Wake County Sheriff’s Office to process their applications). 
 197. For example, the Wake County Sherriff’s Office is open on Monday through Friday from 
8:30 AM to 5:00 PM. Stephen R Walson, Pistol Purchase Permits, WAKEGOV (Oct. 28, 2020), 
http://www.wakegov.com/sheriff/divisions/Pages/pistolpermits.aspx [https://perma.cc/VJ79-9ABM]. 
 198. As one can imagine, this burden is amplified for poorer applicants since every hour lost means 
missed wages. In addition, this disproportionately burdens people of color, who more often rely on 
public transportation in getting to and from work. See Monica Anderson, Who Relies on Public Transit 
in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/07/who-
relies-on-public-transit-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/N5CQ-25CQ]. 
 199. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-402 to 14-409 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.), with 18 U.S.C. § 922 (demonstrating that, unlike the North 
Carolina permit system, under federal law, individuals can accept gifted firearms without a permit). 
 200. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down a law banning 
possession of handguns and other firearms outside of the home because Illinois failed to justify having 
more restrictive laws than any other state). 
 201. Looking back to the First Amendment, we can also see that the Supreme Court has been 
relatively hostile to content-based restrictions. For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 
(2015), the Court struck down a content-based restriction on signs for failing to satisfy strict scrutiny, 
reasoning that “[t]he Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is 
necessary to beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of 
signs that create the same problem.” Id. at 2231. Applying similar reasoning to the North Carolina 
permit system, it is arguable that rifles and shotguns both pose the same danger to the community as 
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admits the inadequacies of the permit system, saying “[y]ou can sue me all day 
but those numbers tell you it’s going to be almost impossible to service that 
number of applications with the processes in place, the background checks that 
are required in the 14-day period.”202 Ironically enough, public officials across 
all of the United States have been steadily working with the NICS—despite 
high volume—to ensure citizens have access to firearms to exercise their Second 
Amendment rights.203 In addition, less burdensome alternatives exist, such as 
community outreach programs, educational brochures with gun purchases, gun 
safety videos distributed by the sheriff’s department online, and so on. 
Even if intermediate scrutiny were applied, the North Carolina permit 
system would still fail to pass muster. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law 
must serve an important governmental objective and the means employed must 
be “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”204 In addition, 
the “justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in 
response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations 
. . . .”205 Here, the government has an interest in crime prevention and public 
safety. However, it is difficult to argue that those interests were at the forefront 
of the permit system because it was enacted during the Jim Crow era alongside 
explicit discriminatory laws. 206  And still today, we see strikingly different 
permit approval rates between Black and White applicants.207 Moreover, in 
modern practice, the permit system fails to further public safety. The permit 
system undermines the federal background check system by allowing for the 
purchase and use of permits for up to five years in the future and obviating the 
need for any further background checks during the five-year period.208 If North 
Carolina is concerned about public safety and crime prevention, it should prefer 
the most recent information available on permit holders. 
Even if First Amendment fee jurisprudence were applied, it is unlikely the 
fees would survive intermediate scrutiny. Under the First Amendment, the fee 
must cover actual administrative costs. 209  Here, the price of each permit 
 
handguns yet are treated differently. It follows that North Carolina cannot claim that the strict limits 
on the handguns are necessary. In other words, the permit system fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
 202. Dillon, supra note 193. 
 203. In fact, NICS is able to provide an answer within minutes for ninety-one percent of the time. 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS, U.S. D.O.J., at iii (2014). 
 204. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins., 
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra Section I.B. 
 207. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
 208. See infra Section IV.D. 
 209. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1942) (striking down a statute requiring a paid 
license to solicit literature, among other things, for failing to impose a regulatory measure calculated 
to defray a legitimate expense of the state). 
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remains five dollars, no matter how many, or how few, one purchases.210 In 
addition, Murdock strongly warns against the nature of such “flat license 
tax[es],” 211  seemingly structured as if to grant the privilege of exercising a 
right,212 not defraying legitimate administrative costs.213 
For example, if an individual purchases five permits at once, they must 
pay twenty-five dollars, but the background and mental health check only 
happens once. Therefore, the number of checks and the administrative burden 
would not increase by the number of permits purchased. The only arguable 
difference would be the number of permits printed. If one permit and one 
background and mental health check cost five dollars in administrative fees, 
then five permits cannot each cost the same amount as the singular permit, as 
the additional four permits do not require the same administrative burden. 
Collectively, the permit system’s cost appears arbitrary as opposed to directly 
tied to administrative burdens. As a result, the permitting system falls short of 
satisfying intermediate scrutiny. 
B. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Unconstitutional Under 
the Second Amendment Using the Kavanaugh Test 
The North Carolina permit system also falls short of constitutionality 
under the Kavanaugh test. Under the Kavanaugh test, courts look to text, 
history, and tradition to see if a law implicating the Second Amendment is 
constitutional.214 In other words, “[t]he scope of the right is thus determined by 
‘historical justifications’ . . . [and] tradition.” 215 As previously discussed, the 
permitting system found in North Carolina was not common historically nor is 
it common today.216 Furthermore, the concept of permit schemes originated in 
 
 210. N.C. DEP’T OF JUST., NORTH CAROLINA FIREARM LAWS 10 (2014), https://ncdoj.gov/ 
ncja/download/102/firearms/17352/north-carolina-firearms-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/594M-K5EE] 
(“There is no limit to the number or frequency of permit applications and the sheriff will charge $5.00 
for each permit requested.”). 
 211. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114 (“It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the 
pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains 
in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their 
exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.”). 
 212. See id. at 114 (“[A] person cannot be compelled ‘to purchase, through a license fee or a license 
tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution.’” quoting Blue Island v. Kozul, 41 N.E.2d 515, 519 
(Ill. 1942))). 
 213. See id. at 115 (“This tax is not a charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed 
by the state. The privilege in question exists apart from state authority. It is guaranteed [to] the people 
by the Federal Constitution.”). 
 214. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). While this is 
a dissenting opinion, with Justice Kavanaugh now sitting on the Supreme Court, it is worthwhile to 
spend a portion of this Comment analyzing his test given the possibility that it could be adopted as the 
standard were he able to convince other Justices to side with him. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Kopel, Background Checks, supra note 82, at 360–61. 
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the eighteenth century as a way to curtail gun ownership among freed slaves.217 
The only permit schemes active today are remnants from the Jim Crow era 
when a small collection of states, North Carolina included, enacted permit 
schemes governing handguns following in the footsteps of New York’s Sullivan 
Act.218 Seemingly, the only tradition present in these permit schemes is the 
tradition of racially charged, discriminatory laws in the United States. 219 
Indeed, there is a common understanding that these types of permit schemes 
were never meant to apply to anyone other than minorities and, given their lack 
of universal application, these permit schemes would not qualify as any sort of 
tradition contemplated by the Kavanaugh test. 220  In addition to lacking 
tradition, the North Carolina permit system is also devoid of any valid historical 
justifications given its underlying racial motivations.221 Therefore, the North 
Carolina permit system is unconstitutional under the Kavanaugh test. 
C. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,222 the Supreme Court held 
that poll taxes are unconstitutional. 223  In that case, the Virginia Board of 
Elections instated a $1.50 tax as a condition to obtaining a ballot.224 The Court 
struck down the measure, reasoning that the right to vote has no relation to 
wealth nor to paying or not paying a fee, holding that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, 
or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process.” 225  In addition, “[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.” 226  Thus, “[t]o 
introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is 
to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.”227 
Just as voting is a fundamental right, so too is the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms. Therefore, applying the principles outlined in 
Harper, an individual’s right to keep and bear arms under the Second 
Amendment cannot be subject to a fee imposed as a condition for exercise of 
 
 217. Id. at 337–38. 
 218. See supra Section I.B. 
 219. See generally Tahmassebi, supra note 185 (describing the historical connection between racism 
and gun control policies). 
 220. See supra Section IV.B. 
 221. Id. 
 222. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 223. See id. at 666 (“We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
standard.”). 
 224. Id. at 668. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 227. Id. 
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that right. The right to keep and bear arms, like the right to vote, has “no 
relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying a fee.”228 Some might argue that 
the Second Amendment is related to wealth since one must purchase a gun to 
exercise the right. However, that argument fails to consider that the permit 
system also regulates gifted firearms or firearms transferred from one person to 
another. Others might argue a five-dollar fee required to obtain a pistol permit 
is insignificant considering the cost of handguns, but Harper makes clear that 
“degree of discrimination” (here, the cost) is irrelevant. 229  Still, some may 
contend that since individuals can obtain alternative arms without an associated 
fee, equal protection under the law is not violated. This contention, however, 
flies in the face of Heller. Heller indicated that handguns are the most popular 
and widely used arms for self-defense in the United States and that the 
existence of alternatives does not justify infringement.230 Viewed under the 
Equal Protection framework, pistol permit fees under the North Carolina 
permit system discriminate against those with less means and severely inhibit 
them from accessing the most popular means of self-defense, allowing for only 
partial enjoyment of Second Amendment rights. Furthermore, poll taxes share 
a common history with gun control—a focus on disenfranchising Black 
Americans of fundamental rights as citizens. 231  The two rights have even 
intertwined at points. In the South in the 1950s and 1960s, Black American gun 
ownership was crucial for providing physical protection to enable voter 
registration efforts. 232  In conclusion, pistol purchase permit fees under the 
permit system are directly comparable to a poll tax and are therefore 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
D. Redundancy and Potential Flaws of the North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit 
System 
As previously discussed, there is significant overlap between the North 
Carolina permit system and federal law, making the permit system largely 
redundant.233 Moreover, the permit system has a major flaw. North Carolina 
 
 228. Id. at 666. 
 229. See id. at 668 (“To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications 
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”). 
 230. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (“It is of no answer to say, as 
petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns as long as the possession of other 
firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed . . . [w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon 
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”). 
 231. See supra Section I.B. 
 232. Cottrol, supra note 95, at 850. 
 233. See supra Section IV.D. 
99 N.C. L REV. 529 (2021) 
558 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
pistol permits are valid for five years.234 During the period for which a permit 
is valid, no additional background checks are conducted. Therefore, one could 
apply for five permits and buy one pistol each year for five years without ever 
having another background check done. This is because under federal law, when 
a buyer has possession of a pistol purchase permit, federally licensed firearm 
dealers do not conduct an NICS background check.235 As a result, there is a real 
possibility that “people who have become prohibited from possessing firearms 
may continue to hold state permits to purchase or permit firearms,” and may 
continue holding the permit without renewing their background check, “if the 
state fails to remove these permits in a timely fashion.” 236 This potentially 
dangerous loophole is yet another reason that the redundant and 
unconstitutional permit system should be repealed. Standardizing the process 
for gun purchases across the board by having federally licensed firearm dealers 
comply with federal law removes the weak point. And while some have concerns 
regarding mental health reporting, part of the repeal could include a mandate 
for reporting prohibited persons to NICS to make sure that no unauthorized 
persons are able to purchase firearms. 
E. The North Carolina Pistol-Purchase Permit System Is Ineffective 
Currently, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska and New York City have similar 
systems to North Carolina, where only handguns require a permit to 
purchase.237 The following states require no permit to buy a handgun: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.238 The following chart represents a collection of the violent crime 
rates in 2014 for the aforementioned states: 
 
 234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-403 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of 
the Gen. Assemb.). 
 235. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(3); 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(d) (2019). 
 236. Background Check Procedures: State by State, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/ 
gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/background-check-procedures-state-by-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RHJ-FJN3]. 
 237. See Licensing, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-
owner-responsibilities/licensing/ [https://perma.cc/D8W3-XBS8] (explaining that only Iowa, 
Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, New York City require permits, which expire after a specified 
period, for the purchase of handguns, but not any other types of firearms). Note that, due to the focus 
of this study, this statement excludes states in which a permit is required to purchase any type of 
firearm. 
 238. The Easiest States To Buy a Gun, HUFFPOST (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-easiest-states-to-buy-a-gun_n_5735cfa8e4b08f96c182dc38 
[https://perma.cc/99TK-WJSV]. Other states not listed implement a permit scheme for both long arms 
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Table 2 
 State Violent Crime Rate 








Iowa 250.1 25241 
Maryland 468.7 73.4 
Michigan 449.4 30.02 
Nebraska 284.8 51.16 
New York242 350.5 46.52 










Alabama243 519.6 N/A 
Alaska 885.0 14.89 
Arkansas 543.6 30.28 
California 447.4 47.95 
Colorado 397.2 47.82 
Delaware 423.6 29.17 
Florida244 384.9 N/A 
Georgia 326.6 72.18 
Idaho 227.1 43.75 
Indiana 382.3 36.66 
 
(rifles and shotguns) and pistols. Id. While outside the scope of this Comment, it is unlikely such 
permitting systems are constitutional under strict scrutiny and have thus been excluded. 
 239. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Table 4: Crime in the United States 
by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2017–2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME 
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/ 
tables/table-4 [https://perma.cc/XYR6-9TMX]. 
 240. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Table 20: Crime in the United 
States, Murder by State, Types of Weapons, 2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME 
REPORTING (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/ 
tables/table-20 [https://perma.cc/3YTS-LAU3] [hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
Murder by State]. 
 241. Data from 2017 was used because the FBI received only a partial report in 2018. Id. 
 242. Since direct data for New York City is not available, data for the entirety of New York 
is  used  for  comparison.  Theoretically,  this  should  improve  the  rates  since  typically  large 
population  centers  have  higher  rates  of  violent  crime.  2017  National  Crime  Victims’  Rights  Week 
Resource  Guide:  Urban  and  Rural  Victimization,  NAT’L  CRIM.  JUST.  REFERENCE  SERV.  (2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2017/images/en_artwork/Fact_Sheets/2017NCVRW_Urb
anRural_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UTU-J5EJ]. 
 243. Alabama was excluded from the “Percentage of Murders with Handguns 2018” list as the FBI 
only received a partial homicide report of two murders. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Murder by 
State, supra note 240. 
 244. Florida did not report murder weapon statistics to the FBI and therefore was excluded from 
the “Percentage of Murders with Handguns 2018” calculation. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
Murder by State, supra note 240. 
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Kansas 439.0 42.73 
Kentucky 211.9 47.26 
Louisiana 537.5 44.72 
Maine 112.1 26.09 
Mississippi 234.4 69.72 
Missouri 502.1 42.34 
Montana 374.1 26.47 
Nevada 541.1 22.89 
New Hampshire 173.2 28.57 
New Mexico 856.6 28.47 
North Dakota 280.6 50.0 
Ohio 279.9 33.70 
Oklahoma 466.1 47.03 
Oregon 285.5 37.04 
Pennsylvania 306.0 58.96 
Rhode Island 219.1 6.25 
South Carolina 488.3 48.7 
South Dakota 404.7 38.46 
Tennessee 623.7 49.40 
Texas 410.9 40.12 
Utah 233.1 28.81 
Vermont 172.0 30.0 
Virginia 200.0 36.06 
Washington 311.5 32.76 
West Virginia 289.9 36.84 
Wisconsin 295.4 37.64 
Wyoming 212.2 50.0 
 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of each state based on its overall violent crime rates 
and percentages of murders committed with handguns. 
 
From Table 2, we can calculate the average crime rates and average 
percentage of murders committed with handguns in states with permit schemes 
for handguns and from states without permit schemes for handguns: 
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Table 3 
 Average Violent Crime 
Rate (Rate per 
100,000) 
Average Percentage of 
Murders Committed 
with Handguns 















Table 3 shows the average violent crime rate as well as the average percentage 
of murders committed with handguns. 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, states without any handgun permit schemes have 
almost 7% fewer murders committed with handguns compared to those states 
that have handgun permit schemes.245 Furthermore, the average violent crime 
rate of states that have permit schemes is only a marginal 4.07% decrease over 
those states without the permit schemes. These statistics suggest that 
mandating handgun permits to reduce murders and violent crimes is ineffective. 
In addition, a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics study revealed that about 21% 
of all state and federal prisoners reported that they had possessed or carried a 
firearm when they committed the offense for which they were serving time in 
prison.246 Fewer than 2% of those who possessed a firearm had obtained said 
firearm through a retail source.247 Of those who specifically used a firearm in a 
crime, only 1.3% reported obtaining the gun from a retail source.248 And while 
many express concerns for “gun show loopholes,” a mere 0.8% of those who 
possessed a firearm obtained it at a gun show, whether through private sale or 
through a dealer.249 
Overwhelmingly, 56% of those who possessed a firearm had either stolen it, 
found it on the scene of a crime, or obtained it from the “underground market.250 
 
 245. Admittedly, more research into this area would be beneficial, as different states have different 
socioeconomic factors that could contribute to the results. Furthermore, information about the status 
of the gun would be useful, such as stolen or legally acquired. 
 246. MARIEL ALPER & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
SOURCE AND USE OF FIREARMS INVOLVED IN CRIMES: SURVEY OF PRISON INMATES, 2016, at 1–
2 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/suficspi16.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2NB-QSXL]. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. The “underground market” is a term used to refer to illegal sources of firearms such as 
markets for stolen goods, middlemen for stolen goods, criminals or criminal enterprises, or those 
involved in the illegal drug trade. Id. 
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Thus, the focus of state legislatures should be on reforming existing gun-control 
laws, which are being subverted with stolen guns and black markets, rather than 
enacting more hoops for law-abiding citizens to jump through. 
Thus, the permit schemes do not appear to achieve their desired goal of 
reducing handgun violence as supported by (1) the average percent of murders 
committed with handguns, and (2) the statistics showing that overwhelmingly 
crime is committed with illegally acquired guns. When analyzing the 
combination of the ineffectiveness of the permit schemes with the fact that the 
permits are mostly redundant with existing federal gun control law, it becomes 
apparent that there is no reason to maintain pistol permit statutes on the books. 
North Carolina should eliminate its permit scheme and align itself with the 
majority of states by simply complying with existing federal gun-control laws. 
Social science on gun violence lends further support for repealing the 
North Carolina permit system. North Carolina claims to have a vested interest 
in reducing gun violence,251 however, focusing on the permitting system and 
gun purchases largely overlooks the leading causes of systemic gun violence. A 
recent study revealed that “the rich–poor gap, level of citizens’ trust in 
institutions, economic opportunity, and public welfare spending were all 
directly related to firearm homicide rates.”252 If North Carolina is concerned 
about gun violence, the tax dollars wasted on an inefficient permit system could 
be better served in directing community outreach programs and social services 
to mitigate gun violence in at-risk communities.253 That same logic extends to 
concerns about gun-related suicides, which have been linked to low income and 
increased unemployment rather than firearm prevalence.254 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina remains in the nineteenth century with an antiquated and 
largely ineffective permit system for the purchase of handguns. The North 
Carolina permit system has direct ties to the Jim Crow era and, like similar 
 
 251. See Ford Porter, Governor Cooper Signs Gun Safety Executive Directive, N.C. GOVERNOR ROY 
COOPER (Aug. 12, 2019), https://governor.nc.gov/news/governor-cooper-signs-gun-safety-executive-
directive [https://perma.cc/2YKF-URFX] (“Wishing, praying, and sending condolences alone just 
aren’t enough to prevent [gun violence]. We have to take action.”). 
 252. Daniel Kim, Social Determinants of Health in Relation to Firearm-Related Homicides in the United 
States: A Nationwide Multilevel Cross-Sectional Study, PLOS MED. 2 (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002978&type=printable 
[https://perma.cc/9G4E-MYDC]. 
 253. For example, New Orleans implemented social and community services focusing on family, 
school, job training, reentry, and community and economic development and saw a 21.9% reduction in 
homicide from 2011 to 2014. ANDREW GUTHRIE FURGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 42 
(2017). In addition, the city saw a 55% reduction in group or gang-involved murders. Id. 
 254. Caillin Langmann, Effect of Firearms Legislation on Suicide and Homicide in Canada from 1981 to 
2016, PLOS ONE 15 (June 18, 2020), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0234457 [https://perma.cc/B858-ZH32 ]. 
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permit schemes passed at the time, is rooted in a time of deep institutional 
racism.255 While Heller and McDonald provide some insight as to the evaluation 
of laws implicating the Second Amendment, lower courts have incorrectly 
diluted the principles.256 However, even under these watered-down principles, 
the North Carolina permit system must be analyzed under strict scrutiny due 
to: (1) its direct impact on the core of the Second Amendment, (2) the burden 
it places on the possession of a handgun in the home, and (3) its similarities to 
First Amendment content-based restrictions. 257  Under strict scrutiny, the 
permitting system fails because it is not narrowly tailored, and it does not 
achieve the government’s goal in increasing public safety. Even under the 
Kavanaugh test, the North Carolina permit system fails to pass muster, as it 
lacks support in tradition and history. 258  Finally, the permit system is 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment when compared to a poll 
tax.259 
North Carolina should repeal its unconstitutional permit system and 
simply treat handguns and long guns the same way. Repealing the permit 
system will simplify the administrative burden on the government, as well as 
the process for citizens seeking to purchase handguns. Federally licensed 
firearm dealers are already equipped to run NICS background checks, which 
reduces the danger of errors when transitioning from the North Carolina permit 
system to the federal requirements for pistol permits. 
Constitutional issues aside, evidence shows that the permit system is 
largely redundant with existing federal gun-control regulations.260 Some even 
postulate that state permit schemes pose a greater danger than the federal 
system given the ability for permit holders to go for years without a background 
check.261 Additionally, statistical evidence shows that handgun permit schemes 
are largely ineffective at achieving any governmental interests. 262  Other 
statistical analysis shows that permit denials disproportionately fall on Black 
applicants, who experience denials at roughly three times the rate of White 
applicants.263 
The North Carolina legislature must act quickly in repealing the permit 
system to fully restore the rights of its citizens, who have been burdened by the 
pistol permit system for far too long. In doing so, North Carolina can attempt 
 
 255. See supra Section I.B. 
 256. See supra Part III. 
 257. See supra Section IV.A. 
 258. See supra Section IV.B. 
 259. See supra Section IV.C. 
 260. See supra Section IV.D. 
 261. See supra Section IV.D. 
 262. See supra Section IV.E. 
 263. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
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